Introduction
'Accountability' is a word that is frequently used in many different parts of society, perhaps most often in the realm of government and politics. As a result a significant literature has grown up in relation to the study of accountability in various disciplines, such as public administration and politics, and its application to certain offices and posts. The word has also been employed increasingly in the field of corporate governance, and perhaps this is commensurate with the rise in the importance and greater use of the expression 'corporate governance.' In the wake of the financial crisis there has been much discussion about whether boards (particularly of banks, but also more generally) are sufficiently accountable. A key government policy is to make companies more accountable to shareholders and the public.
1 Nevertheless, while we see a large number of references to accountability in the titles to books 2 and journal articles, 3 in abstracts to,
The academic corporate governance literature, corporate governance codes, government reports and other publications either opt not to explain what is meant by the concept of accountability or appear to presume that readers understand what it is. 22 But at a time when society is questioning the role of directors and certainly their remuneration and the way that they operate companies, particularly in relation to banks and other large public companies, not least because of the Global Financial Crisis of [2007] [2008] , it causes us to ask: why is there a failure to explain accountability considering that it appears to be regarded as an important issue? One reason might that accountability is a notoriously difficult concept to articulate. The fact is that accountability, as it is discussed in many different contexts, and not just in the corporate governance context, is a complicated and elusive concept. 23 A sense of what accountability actually involves in a precise way is, therefore, lacking. 24 It might be something that one knows when one sees it, but it is difficult to define precisely. cross-purposes.The absence of a clear conception of accountability makes it difficult to assess whether particular corporate governance mechanisms promote accountability, and if not, why not. This lack of clarity can also mask accountability deficits which, in turn, is significant because, as we explore in Part 2, there are a number of reasons why accountability is important, and so it is necessary to be able to identify its absence. A lack of clarity can also result in poorly designed accountability mechanisms. This article aims to address these issues, by exploring the meaning of the concept of accountability and providing a framework to assess whether accountability is present in the corporate governance context, and it does so while focussing on board accountability. The article does not and cannot address the way that accountability plays out in the governance of companies. What the article does is to provide a general framework within which to important issues related to accountability can be considered such as to whom and for what boards are accountable, and what mechanisms can be employed to ensure that accountability exists. 26 The article deals with issues, such as the meaning of accountability, that must be addressed before one can move on to a consideration of the role and nature of the accountability of boards, and the adequacy of measures which might ensure thatboards are in fact accountable.
The article focuses on large public companies, listed or non-listed and does not seek to encompass all types of companies as different issues might be applicable, particularly to small private companies. Within this context the need for accountability can be directed at several actors. Accountability can be a reference to the accountability of the company to society or other stakeholders or the accountability of managers to boards. However as we have seen the main concern in corporate governance is the accountability of the company's board of directors to 26 There are many mechanisms that presently exist that might be regarded as seeking to enhance accountability.
shareholders. Repeating what the Cadbury Report stated: 'The issue for corporate governance is how to strengthen the accountability of boards of directors to shareholders.'
27
The article develops as follows. First, it examines why accountability is important in order to contribute to establishing why the issue we have identified for consideration in this article is worthy of study. Next it articulates why it is important to identify a shared definition of accountability. It then sets out a framework for assessing whether accountability is present in corporate governance. In order to do this it will consider what accountability has been taken to comprise both without and within the field of corporate governance. Finally, there are some concluding remarks.
The Importance of Accountability in Corporate Governance
In legal terms companies governed by Anglo-American corporate law are governed by both the general meeting of shareholders and the board of directors but typically, today, the company's articles of association will vest the board of directors with very broad general management powers. 28 In some jurisdictions, such as the UK, where directors have been given wide-ranging powers, they alone can exercise them, and the only action that the members can take is to pass a special resolution to amend the articles; the shareholders cannot interfere in the exercise of the management power except in very limited circumstances. 29 Elsewhere, such as the US, not even 27 Above n 11, [6.1].
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For example, see in the UK, The Companies (Tables A-F shareholders rely on the board to manage in an appropriate manner. The board itself relies on executive directors and managers to manage the company on a day-to-day basis and in an efficient way. Thus the management of a business by the managers is generally totally in their discretion provided that they do not steal or commit outright fraud. 32 In turn the board has very broad power in relation to making decisions and devising strategy. 33 Because reliance is placed on the board of directors which has exceedingly wide discretion and power vested in it, the law imposes certain obligations on the board members, such as the requirement to discharge fiduciary duties, which are duties requiring loyalty and honesty. According to many, the fact that power is placed in the hands of people other than the shareholders causes something known as an agency problem.
Agency problems are probably the most well-rehearsed rationale for accountability, certainly in the past 30 years or so. accountability guards against the risk that agents will shirk or will exercise the power in their own interests rather than in the interests of their principals. 34 Concern over self-dealing and shirking has been described as the 'standard working assumption underlying corporate governance systems around the world': 35 board accountability is required in corporate governance to address this concern.
This explanation for requiring board accountability fits well with the agency theory of the company, 36 supported heavily by neo-classical economics and law and economics scholars, which provides inter alia that the shareholders are regarded as the true owners of the company and they are the principals of the directors (the board) who act as their agents in running the company's affairs. 37 Consequently, so the theory goes, there is a need to introduce into the governance system some mechanisms that will ensure that the interests of the agents are aligned with those of the principals. 38 If this is not achieved, directors, as they are rational actors and , 39: problems of accountability arise as a result of delegated authority. 35 Licht, above n 25, 3.
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The theory was pioneered by A Alchian and H Demsetz in 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization ' (1972) As professionals they can be trusted to make some degree of personal sacrifice and act honestly and diligently and this is not to be seen as quirky behaviour. 46 However, even if agency theory is not accepted as a basis for accountability, accountability can be grounded on other rationales. Accountability is said to be necessary when actors' conduct impacts upon the rights or interests of others. This second rationale supplements the agency explanation, and while it could result in accountability to a broader range of persons, actors will only be accountable when they are capable of causing harm to, or breach, another's rights. 47 In contrast, accountability on the first basis arises regardless of harm, when agents fail to act in accordance with their principals' preferences, as is the case with fiduciary liability for example.
48
Many explanations for accountability also emphasise its link with power. 49 An essential precept in relation to political power is that the power must be partnered with a system of accountability. 50 Licht has said that accountability is able to be seen as a norm of governance determining modes of wielding power and of responses to power. another's legal relations, common examples being the power of an agent or a trustee. 53 The power-holders are not necessarily more powerful than those whose legal relations they can affect and to whom they owe an account as a result of the delegation of the power. 54 Power in this sense is linked to the agency explanation for accountability.
The second sense of the word 'power' means power over, implying might and domination or being powerful. 55 It is almost a given now in democratic societies that anyone who is granted significant power is accountable for what he or she does with it. The more power that an actor exercises, the more pressing the demands for accountability. Holding power to account is perceived to be an essential safeguard against tyranny because it guards against power being exercised in an oppressive and abusive manner. 56 Hence, it is designed to protect certain people or groups; in this context, the shareholders.
The board has power in both senses. The shareholders effectively delegate power to the board and as a result the latter should be held to account for its use. 57 The amount of discretion a power-holder possesses is also significant in determining the necessary degree of accountability. In exercising their power directors of public companies enjoy 'a remarkable degree of freedom from shareholder command and control.' 59 The fact is that the shareholders in a large company are at a disadvantage when compared with the board. For example, the former lack any or all of the information that is available to the board and which they need in order to assess the directors' performance and/or to know how well the company is doing. This is a classic information asymmetry situation, and making the board accountable remedies that to a certain extent; it at least potentially reduces the level of asymmetry. In addition it is arguable that shareholders cannot protect themselves by way of contracts, for any attempt to write a contract between the shareholders and the board would be otiose as it would be so incomplete, given the various decisions which the board and the managers have to make in the Accountability is necessary because shareholders are not effective monitors of boards.
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As we discuss later, accountability can be seen as a much richer concept than monitoring, involving a number of stages. The fact is that shareholders, and this includes many institutional investors like pension funds, tend not to be motivated monitors of boards. 65 The European Commission appeared to acknowledge there was a problem in getting institutional investors to monitor appropriately as it made it a medium-term objective in its Action Plan of 2003 to require such investors to disclose their exercise of voting rights and how they have used these rights so as to enhance participation of these investors in the affairs of companies. 66 The formulation of the Stewardship Code in the UK might also be seen as recognition by the Financial Reporting
Council that institutional investors do not monitor adequately.
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Furthermore, shareholders can be substantially affected by the actions of the board. 68 As a consequence, the shareholders who contribute the capital to these companies, and indirectly empower the directors, might be said to have reasonable expectations, when investing, that the board will be accountable for what it does as part of the bestowal of power and authority on the board. The requirement to meet expectations can be said to be founded on a degree of moral responsibility that the board has to shareholders. We could assume that shareholders would not be too happy if boards were able to make decisions and take any action without the possibility of what they do being subject to consideration and possible challenge.
However, as already indicated, boards need flexibility to run businesses, so, in the corporate governance context there needs to be a balance between power/authority/discretion that is granted to the board, on the one hand, and the accountability of the board, on the other, as the shareholders are at the mercy of the board whose members can be moved by self-interest.
Accountability is there to correct errors but what it must not do so, according to some commentators, is operate so as 'to destroy the genuine values of authority.' 69 There has been significant consideration of the need for this balance in corporate governance, 70 and probably the central issue in this field is establishing the correct blend of power and accountability. 71 At the time of the Cadbury Report it was thought that there needed to be a greater emphasis on accountability, 72 primarily fuelled by the collapse of some large companies like Polly Peck and Maxwell Communications, but by the time the Hampel Committee was convened, things had changed and it was felt that there needed to be greater focus on enterprise which implied giving directors greater discretion and power to be able to pursue their strategies. 73 Nevertheless, there are clear calls from bodies such as the OECD that corporate governance frameworks should include a sufficient amount of accountability.
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It is also important to the board and to the company as a whole that the board is seen to possess the quality of accountability. Accountability has been described as being critical to legitimacy 75 and actors often seek to be perceived as accountable in order to acquire 69 K Arrow The Limits of Organization (New York: WW Norton, 1974) p 78.
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Bainbridge, above n 29; Hutchison, above n 8; Spira, above n 3.
71
Hutchison, ibid 1116.
72
Above n 11, [1.2].
73
Above n 13, 7. This view has continued amongst some. For example, see Taylor, above n 18, 127. This was because accountability had obscured business prosperity, although it has been said that there does not appear to be sufficient evidence to support that conclusion: Spira, above n 3, 739. legitimacy. 76 Legitimacy refers to 'a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norm, values, beliefs and definitions'. 77 It is important because its presence positively affects how people act towards and perceive an organization. 78 Thus Bovens has argued, in the context of powerful public organizations, that being seen as accountable provides them with legitimacy because transparent, responsive and responsible behaviour shores up the public's confidence in such organizations and means that the public is more likely to trust them with power. 79 It also decreases the costs of persuading the public that they can be trusted.
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Any body or group in society needs to be regarded as legitimate so as to be trusted, and for most this requires the presence of accountability mechanisms. 81 The board is no different, within the limited parameters of the life of a company. If there is accountability then the board will be regarded as legitimately holding power and be able to continue to employ it with the express or implicit acquiescence of the shareholders. 82 Conversely if there were no accounting provided by the board then shareholders and others might be suspicious of nearly everything that the board decided to do. As one commentator has said: 'It would not matter whether the actual decisions being made in a corporation were proper or improper; the fact that they were beyond challenge would make them all suspect.' 83 Therefore, if accountability were not required it would not be healthy for the company and it could well mean that its fortunes would be severely compromised, for investors might be unwilling to trust the board and give it support and invest further capital. Where there are accountability mechanisms the shareholders can have a degree of confidence that directors will take action knowing that they will be accountable for what they do, and any impropriety will be exposed. Besides producing existing shareholder confidence it can produce a wider effect by ensuring more market confidence.
In sum there are a range of reasons why board accountability is important in corporate governance. The next section considers why it is also important that there is a shared understanding of what is meant by accountability.
The Importance of Identifying A Framework For Accountability
One of the key reasons for identifying what accountability means in corporate governance is that no other issues which interest corporate governance scholars, such as to whom should a board be accountable and how accountability is to be secured, can be considered without first getting to grips with this. The lack of a common definition of accountability creates the risk that debates about accountability may be at cross-purposes: because accountability is a concept that is difficult to pin down, discussions about accountability may in fact be focused on different things.
There is the danger that parties who are engaged in devising and assessing corporate measures A further concern is that a failure to identify precisely what is meant by accountability may lead to assumptions that accountability is present, even when it is not, thus masking accountability deficits and undermining policy initiatives aimed at promoting accountability.
Thus, as we will see, in the UK and elsewhere, it has been assumed that by promoting board transparency as a corporate governance mechanism, board accountability will also be promoted. accountability and minimise its harmful effects, measures taken to promote accountability must be carefully designed, and conflicts between such measures avoided. However, this will not be possible without a clear, shared concept of what a framework for accountability looks like and it is to this that the next section turns.
Defining Accountability
To recapitulate, it has been asserted frequently that accountability is a matter of great importance in corporate governance. This is not to say that accountability stands alone as the only central concept of corporate governance. While clearly important in its own right, accountability in corporate governance is related to other matters. These are 'delegation, responsibility, disclosure, autonomy, authority, power and legitimacy,'
98 some of which have been referred to already and others will be referred to in the ensuing discussion.
Accountability is widely accepted to be an elusive concept the meaning of which often depends on context. 99 While this creates challenges for discussing accountability at a general level, more embedded discussions are also problematic because they can reflect the preoccupations of the particular discipline in question, and at the risk of neglecting important aspects of accountability. It is therefore worthwhile stepping back to examine accountability at a more general level. While much of the literature has considered accountability in the public 97 Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, above n 4, S15-S19. See also Sinclair, above n 23, 233 criticising performance evaluation for having the same effect. Sinclair, above n 23, 221 arguing that the more we try to define the concept the murkier it becomes.
sphere and involving political power, it has been suggested that private law, which obviously includes company law, also involves the need for consideration of the meaning and operation of accountability. 100 So, clearly what is said in other contexts can be highly relevant, in broad terms, in determining the meaning and application of accountability in corporate governance, as well as in other areas of private law.
Bovens has argued that part of the difficulty with accountability is that it is used to refer to two different concepts. Accountability as a quality and as a process are closely linked, with the latter promoting the former. However it is unclear whether, for the former to be present, an actor must be subject to the process of accountability. For example if a company responds to consumer pressure by becoming more transparent, or by producing higher quality goods at lower prices, or by dealing more courteously with complaints, would it possess the quality of accountability even if it was not subject to an accountability process? One response is that actors will not exhibit these qualities without such a process. But even if actors were voluntarily compliant it is unclear whether it would be correct to describe them as possessing accountability in the absence of an obligation to account and to face consequences. 138 The presence of the quality of accountability may depend not just practically but also theoretically on the existence of an accountability process. Bottomley has said that: 'Corporate lawyers have long been alert to the problems of promoting and ensuring accountability'. 139 However, as mentioned at the outset, the term 'accountability' tends to get thrown around cavalierly. The presence or absence of accountability seems to be assumed without an account of what it might mean to make such claims.
Defining Accountability in Corporate Governance
Nevertheless in most, if not all, occasions when it is mentioned, the sense in which it seems to be used is accountability as a process and this is the sense that we will adopt. 140 Given this, the key questions that must be answered are to whom directors are accountable, for what and how.
These are complex issues and it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the matters in detail, or to provide definitive answers to these questions but we must broach them in passing in order to put some flesh on our discussion.
Theanswers to the first and second questions may be found in the shareholder value theory which is generally perceived to apply to Anglo-American company law. 141 This provides that the directors are to do that which will ultimately benefit the shareholders of the company. In the 139 Bottomley, above n 22, p 69.
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See for example Blair and Stout, above n 44 (discussing to whom and how directors should be accountable; Bainbridge 'Director Primacy', above n 64, 603 (discussing accountability to shareholders and accountability 'mechanisms'); Jones, above n 3 (discussing liability rules as a means of promoting accountability). One of the benefits of a shareholder value approach is said to be that it simplifies things as far as determining whether the directors have done their job properly. They only have one group to whom they must account, and so they can take their lead as to how they are to act and the decisions they make from what would benefit the shareholders. 146 As we saw, studies on the effects of accountability support this approach as they demonstrate that when people are accountable to more than one audience and in more than one way this can lead to poor outcomes.
But the insights from the accountability literature highlight that the problem created by multiple accountability is not just that it renders directors unaccountable and enables them to shirk more easily which is a common criticism of stakeholder theory, 147 Rather directors will remain accountable to third parties but will prioritise one set of goals against which they can be held accountable over another, for reasons unrelated to good corporate governance and the long term interests of the company. This may occur because the consequences contingent on nonperformance against one set of goals may be more easily measurable or felt more immediately than the consequences contingent on the other, thus encouraging a more short-term perspective. 148 For example measuring quarterly financial performance is likely to be easier than measuring whether having regard to the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment under s. 172 (1)(d) promotes the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole. Accountability mechanisms that required directors to pay attention to the latter may be ineffective insofar as they co-exist with accountability mechanisms that encourage attention to the former.
There has been extensive criticism of the shareholder value approach, 149 but it is not intended to examine these criticisms in the context of this article as the issues are complex and would require greater space than can be devoted to it here. As indicated earlier, our aim is to provide a framework that can be used for consideration of accountability of boards which importantly can be applied to whatever approach might be embraced. For the sake of exposition this article assumes that the shareholder value approach accurately encapsulates the legal position in the UK. We do note that given the fact that accountability is said to be necessary where persons are affected by another's conduct arguably directors should be accountable to a broader range of stakeholders. 150 Again, while it is not possible to resolve this dispute within the confines of the present discussion, nor is that its aim, this disagreement highlights that in order to promote accountability for tangible results, decisions must first be taken about relevant goals and priorities. Arguing that directors should be accountable for promoting shareholder interests claims of its various stakeholders. Claims that directors should be more or less accountable to others incorporate similar normative judgments either explicitly or implicitly.
Turning to how directors are accountable, it will be recalled that accountability as a process requires actors to provide an account to a third party audience that can ask questions and pass judgment, with the possibility of consequences following. An absence of any of these features will mean that full accountability is not present. Governance Code that have been brought into existence. An example is where the latter Code provides that a separate section of the Annual Report should describe the work of the nomination committee. 169 The reporting merely requires that the work of the committee is to be described.
The UK Corporate Governance Code seems to see disclosure as accountability, but it is only one, although important, aspect of the whole process of accountability. While actions such as disclosing, which contribute to transparency, are necessary in the process of accounting, an accounting process must involve more than simply revealing facts or processes, or reporting what has been done. Accountability requires active inquiry such as asking questions, passing judgment and the possibility of consequences. 170 Again the board must not only disclose but also explain and justify its actions, omissions, risks, and dependencies for which it is responsible. enable the board to secure feedback for what it intended to do, and it might provide comfort to the board in that it knows that it has the support of the shareholders before engaging in a particular course of action. In addition, ex ante accounting may be necessary where the quality of the directors' decisions are not easily assessed ex post and so it is not easy to hold them adequately to account. 181 There are some formal ex ante mechanisms in place but they are exceptions. 182 An informal instance of ex ante accounting is where a board holds talks with some shareholders, usually institutional investors, before taking any specific action to gauge the reactions of the latter. On the other hand there is always the danger that ex ante accounting could involve the board endeavouring to shift the burden of responsibility. This could well attenuate the authority and responsibility of the board and that could be deleterious for decision-making. It might be said that in corporate governance accountability is a weapon of supervision and unless there are sanctions it will not be effective, as it will not have a deterrent effect. 187 Insofar as shareholders exert some consequences on the board, accountability could be perceived as a disciplinary mechanism.
While Licht does not accept that accountability includes a punishment element, he accepts that an important part of accountability is righting wrongs (making amends), and if this does not occur then surely there must be some form of enforcement. 188 Unless there are consequences for failing to account then accountability may be viewed as pointless and meaningless. 189 As far back as 1978 the US Business Roundtable said in a report that the enforcement of accountability was important.
Examples of the kinds of consequences that can be identified include directors being held liable by a court, on a derivative action, for a breach of their duties or for the general meeting to vote to remove a director(s) under s 168 of the Act. 191 Again while the board might be able to get a motion through the general meeting of shareholders, it might find that at the voting stage that there are a large number of shareholders who demur in relation to that motion. This has occurred on several occasions with motions concerning the remuneration reports of boards. For instance, It should be noted that accountability can exist even though consequences do not follow:
all that is required is that consequences are possible. Thus a general meeting of shareholders,
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The provision gives the shareholders the right, by way of the passing of an ordinary resolution, to remove a director from office. It is employed rarely. which hears from a board that duties have been breached, might decide that the board should be excused from liability, and it might even ratify what the board has done. This is clearly envisaged from consideration of the derivative action process (under Chapter 11 of the Act),
where shareholders can seek permission from the courts to continue proceedings on behalf of the company against an errant director, several directors or even the whole board (and, possibly, also third parties). Permission must be refused if the company's general meeting has ratified what a director or the board has done.
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The Annual General Meeting constitutes a good example of a mechanism where all of the stages of the accountability process that we have just considered occur. The board has to report to this meeting, members of it may be asked to explain and justify all, or aspects of, the report provided, the members can ask questions and then make a judgment concerning what has been said, and then take action to do various things. Admittedly in the UK, as with most AngloAmerican jurisdictions, the AGM is relatively impotent when it comes to consequences. The shareholders tend to be limited to refusing to re-elect a director who is presented for re-election or hoping, as with several of the cases referred to above, that their discontent with a particular matter might precipitate changes in board processes or attitudes.
In sum, therefore, we can see that UK company law does provide for various mechanisms that either fulfil one stage or all stages in the accountability process with the aim of promoting boards' accountability to shareholders for what they do. However, the discussion also illustrates that a failure to identify what exactly is meant by accountability can lead to a focus on just one or two elements of the process, such as the need for disclosure and transparency, to the neglect of other elements that are essential for full accountability to be present. Full accountability requires 196 The Act, s 263(2)(c) (for England and Wales, and Northern Ireland); s 268(1)(c) (for Scotland).
not only that the board be required to provide information, but also to explain and justify its conduct to a third party against externally set criteria, be subject to questioning and judgment, and vulnerable to consequences.
Conclusion
We have argued that not only is accountability important in corporate governance, it is important to identify exactly what is meant by the term. To this end, drawing on discussions about accountability as a process in other disciplines, we have sought to provide a framework within which to assess whether accountability is present in the corporate governance context. For accountability to exist, there need to be mechanisms in place that require directors to provide an account, for that account to be justified and evaluated, and for there to be the possibility of consequences being imposed upon directors in the light of the account which they give. By providing this framework it should be possible to assess more accurately whether particular corporate governance mechanisms do or do not promote directors' accountability, and if they do not, facilitate a more precise understanding of why not. It provides a context for discussing the normative questions of exactly to whom the board should be accountable, for what, and how, and reduces the possibility of such debates being at cross-purposes. It should also make it easier to identify accountability deficits which might otherwise be obscured: for example, transparency and disclosure do not constitute accountability per se as seems to have been assumed, but are rather necessary steps towards achieving accountability. The upshot is that the accountability argued for here is a strong form as it includes: justification; the requirement of dealing with queries; and consequences.
Finally the framework should assist in identifying the different accountability mechanisms directors may be subject to, and thus assist in avoiding the pitfalls of multiple accountability, as well as accountability gaps. 
